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Short-term Subsidies and Seller Type: A Health
Products Experiment in Uganda
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Abstract
The way in which a product is distributed can have lasting effects on demand by
influencing learning, anchoring price expectations, and shaping perceptions of prod-
uct value. While these issues apply broadly, they are particularly important for health
products in poor countries, where short-term subsidies are common, similar products
are often available through both non-profit and for-profit organizations, and expand-
ing access is an important public health goal. We implemented a field experiment in
northern Uganda in which three curative health products were distributed door-to-door
either free or for sale and by either an NGO or for-profit company. For all three prod-
ucts, subsequent purchase rates were lower after a free distribution. While we see no
difference in subsequent purchase rates based on seller type, we find that contempora-
neous demand for a newly introduced product is higher when the seller identifies as a
not-for-profit organization.
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1 Introduction
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature in marketing, psychology, and economics
investigates how prices may affect not only contemporaneous but subsequent demand.
While the effect of price histories has been studied in a wide range of settings, from home
prices in the United States to Belgian chocolates, it plays a central role in policy debates
about the distribution of health products in low-income countries.1
One of the arguments against the free distribution of health products is that price subsi-
dies may actually discourage future purchase. Give someone an insecticide-treated bed net
for free, one story goes, and he will neither use it properly nor buy another one in the fu-
ture. Offer subsidized water treatment today, and households will not be willing to pay for
it tomorrow. Such effects, if true, can prevent the development of sustainable, functioning
markets for health goods, the kind we take for granted in most developed countries.
Cohen and Dupas (2010) refutes these claims for insecticide-treated bed nets. Free bed
nets given to pregnant women in Kenya are used as intended. Moreover, free distribution
of bed nets actually encourages future purchases (Dupas, 2014). Building an evidence base
for policymaking requires understanding the extent to which these results generalize.
Dupas (2014) illuminates a key input in the policy debate over short-term, free distri-
butions: the tension between learning and price anchors. Seen through this lens, it is easy
to imagine the effect of free distributions on future demand going in either direction. On
one hand, distributing a health product, or any other experience good, gives the recipient
the chance to learn something about the good. Does it work? Does she like it? If the ex-
perience proves better than she expected, all else equal, she will be more likely to buy the
product in the future than had she not received the free distribution.
But all else is not necessarily equal. Our past purchase experiences shape future de-
mand. As described in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), past prices can anchor our perceptions
1In psychology, there is a long history of studying the effect of reference points in absolute judgments
(e.g., Sherif et al., 1958; Doob et al., 1969). A range of studies have demonstrated anchoring effects in
estimation tasks (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995; Chapman and Johnson
1999; Epley and Gilovich 2001). The role of such anchors in the formulation of individuals’ values has since
received considerable attention in classroom and lab experiments as well as scanner data (Ariely et al., 2003;
Mazar et al., 2013; Winer, 1986; Kalwani and Yim, 1992; Raghubir and Corfman, 1999; Rao and Monroe,
1989; Mayhew andWiner, 1992; Dekimpe et al., 1998; Kalyanaram and Little, 1994), although the robustness
of such non-budget-constraint effects of prices on demand has recently been called into question (Fudenberg
et al., 2012; Maniadis et al., 2014). Nunes and Boatwright (2004) provide evidence for the role of incidental
prices in a range of settings, and Simonsohn and Loewenstein (2006) demonstrate behavior consistent with
price anchors in the apartment rental decisions of individuals moving to new cities.
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of value. We hate paying more than we did the last time, we form expectations about future
prices and a product’s intrinsic value based on prices we have observed in the past, and we
do not want to feel foolish when something is given away tomorrow after we paid good
money for it today.
Most of the recent work on pricing for health products in low-income countries focuses
on distributions by NGOs or governments, but for-profit firms often use free samples or
steep introductory discounts to encourage adoption of new products (Schultz et al., 1998;
Seetharaman, 2004; Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004; Villas-Boas, 2004). This raises the ques-
tion: does the seller’s identity matter? For-profit firms do not give consumable products
away for free in perpetuity. On the other hand, an NGO might make regular, free distri-
butions of health products. Do consumers interpret price signals differently depending on
the source? We hypothesized that free distribution by a for-profit firm would shift refer-
ence points or affect price expectations by less than a free distribution by an NGO, from
whom individuals could reasonably expect some chance of the free distributions persisting.
Moreover, individuals may impute different motives for not-for-profits and for-profits, even
when their actions are otherwise identical (Aaker et al., 2010).
To study this set of questions, we implemented a field experiment with 120 villages
in northern Uganda in which three curative health products were distributed door-to-door
either free or for sale and either by an NGO or a for-profit company (Wave 1). Our key
outcomemeasure is the purchase rate for these products during a subsequent (Wave 2) door-
to-door distribution ten weeks later by an unrelated, for-profit firm. As detailed in Section
2, we attempted to adhere to natural marketing processes, with the hope that observed re-
actions from respondents would be characteristic of what would happen outside a research
setting, e.g., we wanted to avoid Hawthorne, John Henry, and measurement effects.
We chose products—Panadol, Elyzole, and Zinkid—for variation in the scope for learn-
ing, not for policy relevance. Panadol, a branded version of a pain reliever widely known
to consumers, provides the most direct test of price anchoring. It is relatively free from
potentially conflating effects of a free distribution on subsequent demand: there are no
positive externalities, little scope for learning, and small if any income effects. Thus the
main mechanism through which current prices can affect future demand is negative anchor-
ing effects.2 Experience with Elyzole, a moderately well-known deworming drug, likely
2Panadol is not unique in its ability to isolate potential anchoring effects. One could use any well-known
product with potential for repeat purchase and free from confounding effects (e.g., croissants). Panadol
has the advantage of sharing characteristics common to the class of health goods, such as being distributed
through drug shops and health centers.
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produces negative learning due to unpleasant side effects (Miguel and Kremer, 2007). In
contrast, experience with Zinkid, an improved but largely unknown treatment for childhood
diarrhea that was recently recommended by the World Health Organization at the time of
our study, likely produces positive learning.
The three products are quite different from insecticide-treated bed nets, the main prod-
uct for which this question has been studied. They are curative rather than preventive,
consumable rather than durable, and unlikely to have meaningful income effects.3 We have
four notable findings.
First, we find suggestive evidence of price anchoring or other direct effects of prices.
For all three products, observed purchase rates when we return to households ten weeks
later are 5 to 12 percentage points lower after a free distribution. We discuss several al-
ternative mechanisms that could explain the difference. Additional data allow us to rule
out many of these, including the mechanical effect of having more of the product on hand
if it had been previously distributed for free. Households’ survey responses are also sug-
gestive of price anchors: those who received free distribution are more likely to report that
they do not want to purchase the product because they or someone in their community had
received it for free in the past. We note, however, that when we conduct an “intention-to-
treat-analysis” that considers all households that were not reached in treatment wave as not
purchasing in the subsequent wave, the effect of the free distribution is only statistically
significant when pooled across the three products.
An important potential alternative explanation for these results, described in Dupas and
Miguel (2017), is that free distribution gave more households an opportunity to experience
the good and could have led them to purchase from alternative sources rather than our
Wave 2 distribution. We unfortunately do not have data from other potential distribution
channels (e.g., drug shops and clinics) for the sample products. Making use of the data we
do have, we note that when asked in a post-marketing survey, those in the free treatment
who did not purchase in Wave 2 are more likely to report high prices or the presence of
free distribution in the area as the reason for their decision. We also find similar treatment
effects where the product (either the same brand or a chemically-identical alternative) was
available from other sources in the village and where it was not. However, if the free
treatment induced households to travel to sources outside the sample to obtain the products
3The use of ITNs reduces the incidence of malaria and may thereby increase households’ income and,
in turn, future demand for additional ITNs (see footnote 27 of Dupas, 2014, for more discussion). In our
context, as discussed in Section 4, we do not believe any income effects would be substantial.
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and these purchases were not reported in the post-marketing survey, we would expect the
pattern of purchases that we observe in Wave 2 even in the absence of price anchors.
Second, our empirical evidence for a model where positive learning can offset negative
demand effects from price anchoring is inconclusive. In percentage terms, relative to the
effects for Panadol, a branded version of a pain reliever widely known to consumers, the
reduction in the share of households purchasing after the free distribution is larger for
Elyzole, the product with scope for negative learning. In contrast, the reduction is smaller
for Zinkid, where there was scope for positive learning and we would expect learning and
price anchors to work in opposite directions. However, none of the differences across
products in the effect of prior free distributions is statistically significant at conventional
levels. Moreover, only two of the three pairwise comparisons conform to the theoretical
predictions when reductions are specified in percent terms rather than percentage points.
Third, contrary to our hypothesis, we find little evidence that the effect of free dis-
tributions on subsequent purchase rates depends on distributor type. However, distribu-
tor identity does matter for the contemporaneous sale of the relatively unknown product.
Households are 14 percentage points (50 percent) more likely to purchase Zinkid from the
non-profit than from the for-profit firm selling at the same price and providing the same
product information. We find no difference for the more well-known products. The finding
that NGOs are more effective at stimulating demand for unknown products has important
policy implications but was not one of our ex ante hypotheses. Furthermore, this difference
does not persist: there is no discernible difference in the subsequent purchase decisions
from an unrelated, for-profit firm between those who were originally offered the product
for sale by the NGO or for-profit marketers. We note that all distribution in Wave 2 was
conducted by a for-profit organization.
Fourth, we find no evidence that the price anchoring effect of free distributions for one
product spills over to the demand for other health products. There is no discernible effect
of having received a product for free in the first wave on the purchase rates of Aquasafe,
a new product offered only in Wave 2. However, we note that confidence intervals for the
cross-product effects are large.
We emphasize that our aim is to contribute to understanding how pricing and distri-
bution strategies affect future purchases. We are not attempting to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of one-time free distributions. Optimal policy, from a social planner’s perspective,
depends on a number of other potentially important factors such as income effects, exter-
nalities, and habit formation. It also depends on the welfare gains from one-time subsidies
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and the implied welfare losses from anchoring. We do not measure these. Even substantial
anchoring effects may not matter from a public health standpoint if there are large welfare
gains from massive increases in coverage in the short run.
As a final caveat, we note that our evidence, like other work on the impact of short-
term subsidies or free distributions, does not speak to questions about permanently free
distribution, a common issue for health goods such as immunizations or maternal care.
But as noted in Dupas (2014), short-term, subsidized distributions are an important policy
tool for products such as antimalarial bed nets, water-treatment kits and condoms. They
are also common after shocks, such as conflict or natural disasters, and may characterize a
wide variety of donor programs that last a single funding cycle.
2 Experimental design & data
2.1 Experimental design
Setting and sampling. We conducted our experiment in Gulu District in northern Uganda,
an area with a large NGO presence and a history of free distributions.4 We selected 120
villages for the study and from each of these villages randomly selected approximately 50
households from the household list kept by the village leaders.5
First wave of marketing. The first wave of marketing (Wave 1), conducted in October-
November 2011, employed a two-level clustered randomization design, with randomization
at both the village and individual level. First, villages were randomly assigned to one of
four treatment groups in a two-by-two design.6 The first treatment dimension was the price
of the product, either free (“Free”) or sold (“Sale”). The second dimension was the type of
4Gulu District was destabilized by an insurgency from 1987 until 2006. In the wake of the insurgency, the
area received a large amount of NGO and government attention. Many NGOs were active in reconstruction
and service provision, including providing free health care and health products. Relative to other regions
in Uganda, Gulu District is likely at the upper end of the distribution in terms of prior exposure to free or
heavily-subsidized distributions of health goods.
5Of these 120 villages, 72 were participating in a contemporaneous methodological study, for which
villages were selected based on availability of certain administrative data. We selected the remaining 48
villages randomly from an administrative government list of villages in Gulu. We selected a total of 859
households based on the availability of institutional data, a requirement for the other study. We randomly
selected the remaining households from village household lists.
6Village assignment to treatment was block randomized according to two variables. The first, price envi-
ronment, included information about pricing and drug availability with three possible categories: (1) no drug
outlets or none of our drugs; (2) no prices above the median or distributed for free; and (3) at least one price
above the median. The second, remoteness, also had three categories: (1) easy to travel and close to health
center; (2) difficult travel or far from health center; and (3) difficult travel and far from health center.
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distributing organization: either a not-for-profit, non-governmental organization (“NGO”)
or a for-profit business (“For-Profit”). Thirty villages were assigned to each of the four
treatment cells. Table 1 illustrates balance across our village treatment assignments.
Within each village, we randomly assigned households to be offered one of three prod-
ucts: Panadol (paracetamol, a painreliever), Elyzole (albendazole, a deworming medica-
tion), and a combination pack of Restors and Zinkid (oral rehydration salts, “ORS” and
zinc supplements, the World Health Organization’s recommended treatment for childhood
diarrhea). For the Sale treatment group, we used the same price in each village. We aimed
to set the price for the Sale group to approximate a market price (i.e., the perceived price
plus a small add-on for the convenience of buying at one’s home) and discourage resale.7
We note, however, that the products we offered were available for sale in local drug shops
in only 11%-36% of the study villages. In villages where the experimental product was not
available, neither the shop nor market price is well defined.8
In order to maximize the likelihood that individuals perceived the various marketing
and sales interactions as natural rather than experimental artifacts, we partnered with real
Ugandan organizations involved in the provision of health products. For the NGO treat-
ment, we worked with the Uganda Health Marketing Group (“UHMG”), a large Kampala-
based NGO largely funded by USAID and focused on the distribution and promotion of
health products. For the For-Profit distribution, we worked with Star Pharmaceuticals Ltd
(“Star”), a large, Kampala-based company that imports, distributes and markets medicines
7Note we randomized the presence of free versus sale distribution, and NGO versus for-profit, at the
village level, whereas the exact product received we randomized at the individual level. Thus our estimates
are not biased from spillovers if the information flow is about the presence of an organization giving out free
health products. The correct interpretation of our estimates includes both the direct effect of the treatment on
a household’s later behavior and a potential reinforcement effect (those around them also received the same
treatment and, through conversations and sharing of information, reinforced any effect). We are estimating
the combined effect, which is also the policy-relevant parameter given the typical practice of community-
level distribution of health products. However, given that the exact product distributed was randomized at the
household level, giving out a particular health product for free may have cross-product spillovers. While this
could bias product-specific estimates, we do not see evidence of cross-product effects on purchase rates.
8Drug shop prices were collected in a pricing survey conducted prior to Wave 1. In earlier circulated
versions of this paper, we referred to this as selling above the market price, but we have changed the language
for three reasons. First, as noted, in the majority of villages the products we offered were not available
for sale, so the market price is undefined in much of our sample. Second, as the figures in Appendix A
demonstrate, drug outlet prices and price perceptions vary widely between and at times even within village.
Third, our door-to-door distribution also builds in transport and convenience, which we would expect to
influence households’ perception of how competitive our prices are relative to other alternatives. The prices
set in the first wave were as follows: Panadol: UGX 500 ($0.20) for a strip of ten tablets, Elyzole: UGX
1,800 ($0.71) for three packs with two tablets each, Restors/Zinkid combination pack: UGX 2,000 ($0.79)
for one sachet of Restors and ten tablets of Zinkid.
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and other products for sale throughout Uganda. Although the marketers were employed
by UHMG and Star, we recruited, trained and monitored the marketers using the same
protocols for both NGO and For-Profit distribution. Marketers wore branded t-shirts and
displayed ID-cards from the relevant partner organization. The field marketers were all
locally recruited, reducing communication barriers.
To mitigate potential liquidity constraints in the Sale treatment arm, several days be-
forehand the marketers distributed flyers throughout the village to announce the upcoming
marketing visit. The aim was to reduce short-term liquidity constraints. In order to min-
imize potential for differential response rates, a similar flyer was distributed in the Free
treatment arm announcing a distribution but not detailing whether products would be free
or sold.9
Throughout the study, we attempted to adhere to a natural marketing process. We
wanted to avoid marketing procedures that deviated considerably from normal operating
practices of NGOs or firms, so that the observed reactions of respondents would be more
natural. In particular, we expected that returning on several consecutive days to a remote
village to search for a specific respondent by name would be perceived as atypical behav-
ior for an NGO or ostensibly profit-maximizing firm with the aim of sustainable product
delivery. This in turn could generate experimenter effects and mask the true effect of price
anchors. In practice, marketers made a single attempt to locate the head of household,
as identified on the household list kept by the village leaders, or their spouse. While this
methodological choice gives us greater confidence that our findings accurately reflect the
effect of free distributions in non-experimental settings, it is not without costs. Out of the
original 5,667 households identified to be in the study, 3,879 were found in the first wave
of marketing. This is a lower level of entrance into the sample frame than often found in
developing country studies. As discussed more fully below, this pattern reappears when
looking at attrition in our second wave. In each attempt to locate specific respondents, we
9The flyers differed slightly by referring to an “upcoming distribution” in the Free treatment villages
and an upcoming “sale at a good price” in the sale villages. This may have induced different average rates
for entering into the Wave 1 sample frame between the Sale and Free treatments (65.4% versus 70.5%,
respectively). As shown in Panel A of Appendix Table A1, the differential entry rate is larger for households
assigned Panadol. However, the flyers were distributed widely in the village and made no mention of the
product that was going to be offered, which was randomized at the household level and only revealed to
households once they entered the sample frame. We therefore conjecture that the imbalance for Panadol
was due to bad luck and not selection on unobserved willingness-to-pay for the product. In hindsight, we
believe this design decision was a mistake. For clarity of interpretation, the challenges this design poses for
interpretation outweigh the potential gains from more natural marketing efforts, and we should have used the
same flyers for all treatment arms.
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found approximately 75 percent of targeted individuals.
Marketers delivered sales pitches specific to each product, price treatment (Free or Sale)
and entity (NGO or For-Profit). A pharmacist trained the marketers on how to explain
usage and dosage guidelines and other questions about the products.10 The script for the
Sale treatment by an NGO explained the sale price by saying “pay a small amount to share”
in the cost, whereas the Sale script for the for-profit said “at great prices”. The aim was to
reflect marketing practices typical of the distributing entity. The phrase “at great prices” is
common for marketing by for-profit entities such as UHMG and Star and would have been
unusual for an NGO. This difference in wording may have generated differences in how
the experimental prices were perceived. We discuss the implications of this in Section 3;
details on the marketing scripts appear in Appendix B.1 and B.2.
In Wave 1, we offered one unit of the assigned product to households in the Free treat-
ment arm and five units to those in the Sale treatment.11 Prices were non-negotiable. Once
this transaction had been completed, marketers administered a questionnaire to respondents
in the Sale treatment group about why they decided to buy or not to buy and who might
use the product.12 In all cases, marketers had only one day to reach all respondents in each
village. Marketing was not continued on a second day in order to reduce the possibility of
spillovers of information or expectations across respondents.
The three products were chosen deliberately to capture a range of potential learning
effects that could influence purchase decisions. Panadol, a branded version of the common
painreliever paracetamol, serves as a benchmark. Nearly all respondents were likely to
have been familiar with paracetamol, and we expect little scope for learning.13 For Ely-
zole, a deworming medication, we expected that based on the relative salience of immediate
side effects learning effects would tend to be negative despite potential for long-run bene-
10Marketers gave respondents information on dosage, storage and recommended use of the respective prod-
uct both verbally and in writing in Acholi, the local language. This information was based on the instruction
sheet of the drug and formulated in consultation with a pharmacist and board member of the Ugandan Na-
tional Drug Authority.
11One unit corresponds to the smallest amount of each product that could be sold separately. For Panadol
this was 10 tablets, for Elyzole this was 6 tablets, for Restors/Zinkid this was 1 sachet of Restors and 10
tablets of Zinkid, and for Aquasafe this was 8 tablets. We provided only one unit for free in order to reflect
realistic distribution practices that would be observed outside of the experimental setting. Free distributions
tend to be limited to a specific number of units. This is less likely for a distribution where products are
sold, where we imposed a cap for logistical reasons. Only 2.5 percent of households in the Sale treatment
purchased five units, suggesting that the cap on the quantity of units for sale was only rarely, if ever, binding.
12This survey was not conducted in the Free group in order to keep the interaction more natural.
13It is, however possible, that households that had not tried the branded version may have learned about
differences between branded and generic paracetamol.
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fits (Miguel and Kremer, 2004).14 Zinkid was sold in combination with Restors, an oral-
rehydration salt, following clinical recommendations (World Health Organization, 2005).
While generic oral-rehydration is widely used and freely available from health centers, the
importance of zinc supplements in combating diarrhea had only recently been established
in the global health literature. As such, Zinkid represents a new brand and product for
which we expect there to be scope for positive learning.15 Table 2 presents descriptive
results from the price perception and product awareness survey. While our three products
were intended to encompass a range of potential learning about the effectiveness of types
of health products, these distinctions abstract away from other potential sources of learning
such as learning about brand or price. We consider the implications of alternative versions
of learning in Section 4.16
Second wave of marketing. We conducted the second wave of marketing (Wave 2) on
average ten weeks after Wave 1, in December of 2011.17 The sole purpose of Wave 2 was
to get an outcome measure of respondents’ willingness to pay for health goods. Marketers
made a single attempt to locate the person interviewed in Wave 1 or, if that person was
not available, their spouse. In order to avoid reputation effects from the first stage, we
partnered with a different for-profit firm, Surgipharm Uganda Ltd (“Surgipharm”). Again,
marketers were employed by the partner, but recruited, trained and monitored by the study
team. In order to reduce association between the two waves, we changed the wording of
all scripts without significantly affecting the content. In order to reduce the probability that
respondents associated Wave 2 with Wave 1, we also assigned marketers to villages such
that individual marketers did not visit the same village twice. While there may be time
trends in the demand for health products, we do not believe there is any reason to expect
14While the immediate side effects of deworming medication are negative, the pill works and alleviates
symptoms such as lethargy in individuals with symptomatic worm infections. Whether positive or negative
learning dominates depends on both the relative size of the asymptomatic and symptomatic populations as
well as the specific learning process.
15Zinc became part of theWHO guidelines for the treatment of diarrhea in 2006. In a study carried out with
Zinkid users by our partner the Ugandan Health Marketing Group in 2012, 93 percent of zinc users believed
that the product was an effective treatment for diarrhea, citing a quick end to diarrhea and fast recovery by
the child as primary reasons for this belief.
16The three products also differ in terms of who would be the target user, which could affect the scope for
learning. The type of Panadol used was aimed at adults only; children under 12 were not allowed to use it.
Although Elyzole could be used by people of any age (except babies), parasitic infestations are most acute
amongst children. Zinkid was a product specifically aimed at children, with a target age group of six months
to five years.
17The minimum number of weeks between marketing waves was 6, the maximum 12 weeks, and the
median is 10 weeks. Timing varied for logistical reasons, such as weather and holidays. We do not find any
evidence that observed effects are correlated with differences in the number of days between waves.
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seasonal fluctuations in demand to vary according to treatment status.18
We then investigate whether having received any product for free affects the purchase
rate of other health products. We therefore assigned 25 percent of households to be offered
a fourth product not offered in Wave 1, Aquasafe, a product designed for home water purifi-
cation. Since no learning about specific product characteristics takes place across products,
the cross-product test allows us to assess whether price anchoring will occur for broadly
construed product categories, such as “health products”.19 In the second marketing wave,
the only randomization was the household-level assignment of the product: 25 percent of
households were marketed the new product, Aquasafe, and 75 percent the same product
from Wave 1. Figure A1 summarizes the experimental design.
Attrition. As shown in Table 1, in Wave 2 we found 2,887 of the 3,879 individuals
treated in Wave 1. This attrition rate of 25.6% resulted from a deliberate methodological
decision to adhere to a natural marketing process, which precluded tracking specific house-
holds over multiple days. As shown in Appendix Table A1, attrition between waves is
uncorrelated with individual characteristics (other than gender), including whether or not
the subject received the product in Wave 1. See Panel B of Appendix Table A1 for de-
tails. Attrition is not correlated with assignment to the Free or Sale treatments. We found
74.7% and 74.2% of Wave 1 subjects, respectively (p-value: 0.856). Attrition is, how-
ever, marginally correlated with assignment to the NGO vs. for-profit treatments, where
we found 76.5% vs. 72.3% of subjects, respectively (p-value: 0.110).
2.2 Data
Village and drug outlet data. Before Wave 1, we surveyed community leaders and drug
outlets. We first asked the village chief about the number and type of drug outlets (includ-
ing drug shops, clinics and hospitals) in each village, the distance (in time and kilometers)
18Panadol is a painkiller that is used frequently to treat a variety of illnesses year-round, especially as
it often means avoiding a visit to the health center. The Ugandan Ministry of Health suggests preventive
deworming of children every three to six months, so we would expect participants to demandmore deworming
medication at the time of our second visit (Ministry of Health, Republic of Uganda, 2012). Childhood
diarrhea is more common during the rainy season (Ahmed et al., 2008), therefore we might expect higher
demand for Zinkid to treat diarrhea in Wave 1 when rains were more common.
19The mechanisms of any such cross-product effects could include beliefs about the general quality of prod-
ucts marketed in a particular way (i.e., door-to-door or by a for-profit entity) or categorical price judgments,
whereby individuals judge utility of purchase by comparing the price of product to endpoints or distributions
within the product category. For discussions of the latter mechanism, see, for example, Alba et al. (1999) and
Mazar et al. (2013).
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to the most popular and nearest facilities and any recent free distributions of health prod-
ucts. We then visited every drug outlet (including both private drug shops and local health
clinics) in each village and asked about the price, availability and preferred brand for a list
of common drugs. There were drug outlets in 64 of the 120 villages and, when a drug out-
let was present, an average of 2.4 outlets per village. We used these data to determine the
relevant “shop price” for the drugs we were offering, stratification, and to test for treatment
effect heterogeneity.
Price perception survey. Immediately prior to offering the product, marketers admin-
istered a price perception survey to 50 percent of respondents in Wave 1. After introducing
themselves, marketers showed respondents the two products other than the one assigned to
that individual to avoid potential anchoring effects on the product about to be offered for
sale or gift. After a brief description of the use of the product in general, respondents were
asked about their familiarity with the product and brand. If they were familiar with the
product, they were asked where they could purchase it and what price they would expect to
pay. In Wave 1, we solicited price perceptions of the three goods distributed in the wave.
In Wave 2, individuals were asked only about the new product, Aquasafe.
Post marketing survey. In order to understand the mechanisms influencing purchase
decisions, we conducted a short survey (Appendix C) of all individuals who were offered
products for sale (those assigned to the Sale group in theWave 1 and all individuals inWave
2). The survey was designed to mimic traditional marketing research in order to ensure that
participants’ experience was natural. The survey asked respondents in an unprompted way
to explain why they did or did not purchase the product.
Observational usage data from physical observation of packaging. During Wave 1,
all respondents who had received a product, whether for free or purchased, were informed
that that they had also been entered into a lottery. If selected, they would need to present
the product packaging (blister packs) in order to claim their prize. It was clearly stated
that the prize did not depend on how much of the product was used, only on whether they
presented the blister packs. Six to eight weeks after Wave 1 (two to four weeks before
Wave 2), surveyors made unannounced visits to a sample of 329 households that received
a product in Wave 1 and recorded how many tablets were remaining in the blister packs.20
20Surveyors were given details about how many units of the product each respondent had received, and so
were able to verify whether all packaging was present. Furthermore, all blister packs distributed by marketers
in Wave 1 had been discretely marked so that they could be identified as packaging distributed by our mar-
keters, rather than the same product obtained from elsewhere. Here we deviated from our overall strategy of
“naturalness.” In this instance, we felt that acquiring some data on usage was important enough to deviate, but
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3 Results
In our setting, free health goods can affect demand through two different mechanisms:
price anchoring and learning. We generated exogenous variation along three dimensions:
whether a product was offered for free or for sale in Wave 1, whether it was offered by
an NGO or a for-profit company in Wave 1, and the product a household was offered.
The product price and the type of distributing organization were randomly assigned at the
village level, while the product type was assigned at the household level. To estimate our
treatment effects, we run the following basic specification for each product k
yi jkt = βk0+βk1NGO j +βk2Freei j +βk3Free j×NGO j + γkX j + εi jkt , (1)
where y is a measure of purchase rates (either a binary indicator of take-up or the total
quantity purchased/received), i represents households, j represents villages, and t repre-
sents time (Wave 1 or Wave 2). NGO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a
household was approached by a representative of an NGO in Wave 1 and 0 if approached
by a for-profit. The dummy variable Free takes the value 1 if a household was offered
the product for free in Wave 1 and 0 otherwise. Coefficients of interest are the betas. β1
captures the effect of an NGO being the distributing organization in Wave 1, β2 the effect
of being offered a product for free in Wave 1, and β3 the effect of the interaction, i.e., being
offered a free product by an NGO in Wave 1. X j is the vector cross product of the two strat-
ification variables: a price index and a remoteness index. εi jkt represents the idiosyncratic
error, which we cluster at the village, the level of randomization.21 We estimate equation
(1) for the pooled sample and for each product individually.
To facilitate interpretation, we also estimate for each product k a specification that ex-
cludes the NGO terms
yi jkt = βk0+βk4Free j + γkX j + εi jkt (2)
although we note that to the extent there is an interaction between the effect of free dis-
tributions and the identity of the distributor (β3 6= 0) this regression will not provide an
unbiased estimate of the Free treatment effect.
to roll it out in a promotional way so that it still was implemented under the pretense of a market introduction
of goods. Those who did “win” the lottery (about 10%) do not behave differently in Wave 2.
21Stratification was primarily done to ensure balance. Although power is limited for subsample analyses,
we do examine whether results are heterogeneous regarding remoteness and price levels. The results do not
exhibit any significant heterogeneity along these dimensions.
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3.1 Take-up in Wave 1
Table 3 shows the results, by product, from estimating equation (1) for Wave 1. The odd
numbered columns show the effects of treatment assignment on take-up defined as a binary
variable equal to 1 if a household purchased or accepted any quantity of the offered prod-
uct and 0 otherwise. The even numbered columns report the quantity effects as measured
in units of the product. We focus our discussion on Panel B, which reports results for all
households found in Wave 1. In order to address the potential for differential selection
into our sample described in Section 2.1, Panel A reports the results of an “intention-to-
treat” analysis using the full sample of 5,667 households irrespective of whether they were
reached by marketers. For households that were not reached, we code them as not purchas-
ing. This reflects the possibility that, given a preannouncement of the marketing, failure
to be present may reflect a particularly low willingness-to-pay for the product.22 Panel C
reports the Wave 1 results for just those households that were found in both waves.
Unsurprisingly, take-up was much higher among those who were offered health prod-
ucts for free compared to those offered them for sale. As the odd-numbered columns show,
among households in the for-profit group, being offered the product for free increased bi-
nary take-up by 46.3 percentage points for Elyzole, 23.7 percentage points for Panadol, and
69.9 percentage points for Zinkid. All coefficients are statistically significant with p-values
below 0.01.23
The effect of free distribution on the quantity received follows a similar pattern for Ely-
zole and Zinkid: those in the Free treatment were not only more likely to receive any of the
assigned product but also received more of the product on average. However, the Sale treat-
ment increased the average quantity of Panadol obtained by 0.732 units (or 73.2 percent)
22We were unable to verify the initial product assignments for 537 of the 1,788 households that were not
reached for our original treatment. In order to estimate the intention-to-treat specification, we imputed the
initial treatment assignment using the same assignment protocols in the implementation. Because we do not
have individual data on those not reached beyond the summary data described in Appendix Table A1, we have
limited ability to empirically examine how those who selected in may be different ex ante to those who did
not. While the results are qualitatively similar across sample frames and this imputation, they are not exactly
the same. This highlights the methodological importance of paying attention to the message and means of
soliciting individuals into experiments. In situations when individuals may have advance information about
an upcoming treatment (in this case, the distribution of health products), it is important to keep accurate
tracking sheets so that the initial entry into the sample frame can be understood well. In this case, we did not
do that, and we would have learned more had we done so (Gazalle et al., 2011).
23The results in Table 3 for “any purchase” (the odd columns) are robust to using a Probit specification
for the binary outcome variable. Those for the quantity purchased (the even columns) are robust to the Tobit
specification, which accounts for left censoring of the dependent variable at zero and right censoring at one
or five units, depending on the treatment group.
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relative to the Free treatment. As described above, households in the Sale treatment could
purchase up to five units of the assigned product while distribution in the Free treatment
was limited to one unit per household. In the case of Panadol, this leads to a reversal in
the sign of the treatment effect between the binary and quantity regressions. While not all
of the households in the Sale treatment purchased the product, those who did so purchased
more than one unit on average. Surprisingly, the purchase rate was similar in those villages
where Panadol or its equivalent was available at drug shops and in those where it was not.
The intention-to-treat analysis in Panel A, which treats households that were not reached
as not purchasing, preserves the pattern and statistical significance of coefficients reported
in the Wave 1 sample.
Table 3 also shows that in the case of the unknown product (Zinkid), households were
substantially more likely to purchase the product when it was offered for sale by an NGO
rather than a for-profit entity. This difference is both statistically and economically sig-
nificant: a 15.9 percentage point increase in take-up and a 50.7 percent increase in total
quantity purchased.24 Recall that the marketing scripts differed only in their description
of the seller’s identity and motives. All information presented about the product itself was
identical across the four treatment arms. Differences in the take-up rate could result ei-
ther from differences in how households interpreted marketing information about product
quality (e.g., the NGO was considered more accurate or trustworthy) or from how they
perceived the offer prices (e.g., when offered by the NGO a price was considered a “better
deal”). For the more well-known products, no such difference is evident.
Qualitative results from the post-marketing survey suggest a potential mechanism. Those
offered Zinkid for sale by the NGO were more likely than those in the for-profit treatment
to cite the product’s health benefits as a reason for purchase (p-value: 0.059); however,
they were no more likely to state “I purchased this because I trust you.” We speculate that
the results may still reflect a greater trust in the NGO when considering new products, but
individuals are not explicitly aware of the NGO’s role in forming their impressions. The
magnitude of this effect is large: take-up increases from 30 percent to 46 percent.25 This
is consistent with other emerging work that points to the potential role of non-profit or-
ganizations as trust builders and may have important policy implications for organizations
24The calculated percentage change is equal to NGO effect on quantity, 0.173, divided by the mean number
of units purchased by those in the For-Profit-Sale treatment, 0.341. The latter is not equal to the constant in
the regression equations because the regression includes controls for stratification variables.
25These are the take-up rates in the For-Profit-Sale and NGO-Sale treatment arms, respectively. As noted
above, the constant terms in the regression results reflect the inclusion of controls for stratification variables.
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seeking to encourage the adoption of new technologies (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan, 2014).
While our study design does not allow us to speak further to the mechanisms behind this
effect, we believe future research into the role played by NGOs in stimulating demand for
new products would be valuable.
3.2 Purchase Rates in Wave 2
Next, we turn to the question of what is the impact on future purchase rates of distributing
the products for free. As previously described, in our setting, the impact of free distribution
consists of two basic effects: a price anchoring effect that may depress demand and an in-
formation effect whose direction depends on whether the potential for learning is primarily
positive or negative. Table 4 shows the results, by product, from estimating equation (1)
for Wave 2 purchase behavior on the sample of all households found in Wave 2.
First, we examine the results pooled across all three products. Column 1 of Table 4
presents the effect on the extensive (Panel A) and intensive (Panel B) margins. In both
cases, we find that the provision of free products leads to lower purchase rates approxi-
mately ten weeks later, with take-up after a free distribution 10 percentage points lower
than after the for-sale distribution. However, note that this result pools three products that
we deliberately chose for the experiment, not some naturally occurring set of products.
For each of the three products offered in Wave 1, subsequent purchase rates are lower
in Wave 2 if the product was initially offered for free. For Panadol and Elyzole, the results
are substantial and statistically significant. The bottom of panel A reports results from
estimating the simplified equation (2), without the NGO terms. As shown in columns 2
and 3, those previously receiving the product for free are 9.1 percentage points (s.e.: 2.8)
and 12.0 percentage points (s.e.: 4.1) less likely to purchase any of the product in Wave
2. In the case of Zinkid, for which there is scope for positive learning, the effect is muted.
The purchase rate of Zinkid in the Free treatment group is 5.3 percentage points (s.e.: 3.7)
lower than in the Sale treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant (column
4). Panel B displays results for the quantity of units purchased. Again, the effect of prior
free distribution is negative and substantial for both Panadol and Elyzole, a reduction in the
quantity purchased of 0.24 and 0.18 units, respectively. The effect of prior free distribution
of Zinkid, the product with scope for positive learning, is negligible.26
26Although the treatments were randomly assigned at the village level, there is a slightly higher share of
women in the for-profit sample versus the NGO sample (Table 1). Therefore, as a robustness check, we also
estimate the regression specification for Table 4 including controls for the respondent’s gender and gender
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We cannot compare the purchase rate across time in order to determine whether the
free distribution reduced purchase rates in absolute terms or merely relative to a sales dis-
tribution. Unfortunately, such an analysis would not be valid as the two distribution waves
occurred at different times in the year and demand is subject to seasonal variation.
We do not find evidence that the anchoring effect of free distributions spills over to
other health products. Column 4 reports the effect of Wave 1 treatment status on the Wave
2 purchase decisions for a new product, Aquasafe. Note that because there is no reason
to suspect cross-product learning, this is a test of whether free distribution of one health
product moves the reference point for another. Naturally, this is not dispositive. We are
testing potential cross-product spillovers from one of three particular products to another
product offered by a different organization. We cannot reject the null of no effect. While
the 95%-confidence interval rules out a cross-product effect as large as the own effect of
free distribution for Panadol or Elyzole, it remains quite large. The 95%-confidence inter-
val spans from -8.7 to +6.7 percentage points. We also do not see statistically significant
differences between prior distribution by an NGO and prior distribution by a for-profit.
As with the Wave 1 results, we also conduct an “intention-to-treat” analysis using both
the full sample of 5,667 households irrespective of whether they were ever reached by
marketers and then for the sample of all 3,879 households reached in Wave 1. As described
above, we code all households that were not reached as not purchasing. Panels A and B
of Table 5 report the results from the intention-to-treat analysis. For ease of comparison,
Panel C replicates the take-up results reported in Table 4. When we include all observations
in the initial sample frame none of the individual product coefficients remains statistically
significant. The anchoring effect remains significant in the pooled sample, albeit with a
reduced magnitude due to the attrition rate of approximately 25% across rounds that we
discuss in Section 2.1.
We note that in the case of Panadol, there is some evidence that free distributions by
an NGO suffer less of an anchoring effect than those by for-profits. This is contrary to
the hypothesis we had in the design of the experiment that a free distribution by an NGO
may shift expectations about future prices whereas a for-profit may be perceived as simply
trying to improve its brand image or providing free samples for learning or habit formation.
interacted with treatment. Although female respondents are slightly more likely to purchase each of the health
products than men, none of the differences are significant, and the estimates of the primary treatment effects
are substantially unchanged when these individual controls are included. Table A7 reports these results. Note
also that reported percentage changes are relative to the Sale treatment mean; the regression constant reflects
inclusion of controls for stratification variables.
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The result is not robust to different sample frames and sample-entrance assumptions, and
thus we caution against making any substantive inference.
4 Discussion and alternative explanations
The empirical results show that purchase rates following a free distribution can be lower
than following a for-sale distribution. Here we first consider the qualitative evidence in
support of price anchors and then consider alternative mechanisms. We also discuss poten-
tial limitations in our interpretation of the scope for learning about different products and
some methodological suggestions for future work.
Qualitative evidence from the post-marketing questionnaire supports the role of price
anchors in reducing relative demand following a free distribution. After the Wave 2 distri-
bution, the marketers asked all respondents why they made their purchase decisions. The
question was asked in an open-ended way without prompting, and surveyors coded the re-
sponses into predetermined categories based on piloting of survey questions. As is shown
in Figure 1, among those who decided not to purchase the offered good in Wave 2, 10.4
percent of respondents in the Free treatment stated that they did not purchase the product
because either they or others whom they knew had previously been given it for free. In con-
trast, only 2.2 percent of those in the Sale treatment responded similarly (p-value: 0.000).
A further 4.1 percent of the Free treatment group stated that the product was too expensive
versus 1.7 percent in the Sale group (p-value: 0.027). While these responses are subject to
the qualification that these responses are participants’ self-reported explanations for own
behavior, the Wave 2 distributors were affiliated with a different entity than either of those
seen in Wave 1, ameliorating concerns over experimenter demand effects. Furthermore, in
the supplemental survey of 1,069 households in 84 of the 120 study villages between the
Free and Sale treatments, households in the Free treatment were 13 percentage points more
likely to expect distribution of similar health products to be free in the future (p-value:
0.022).
Next, we assess the plausibility of eight alternative mechanisms that could explain dif-
ferential effects between free and priced distributions. These include (i) stock on hand,
(ii) expectations of a pricing regime change, (iii) income effects, (iv) liquidity constraints,
(v) externalities, (vi) habit formation, (vii) prices as a signal of quality, and (viii) cognitive
costs. Below we consider each in turn.
First, we consider what is perhaps the most obvious alternative mechanism through
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which free distribution could reduce future purchase rates: stock. A central limitation of
this paper is that data on demand for health products comes exclusively from purchases
made through our door-to-door marketing campaigns and no data is collected on purchases
made outside of the experimental distribution from local health suppliers. If, for example,
participants in the free distribution arm were more likely to purchase or acquire products
after our distribution, this would mean that we underestimate demand in the free arm by
measuring purchase rates only through our experimental data collection. While we cannot
fully rule out unobserved differences in arms that come from purchase rates outside of our
data collection, we provide several sources of data to calibrate the extent to which these
effects are likely to affect the interpretation of our findings. We first consider whether
those in the free distribution arm may not purchase in Wave 2 simply because they still
have a stock of the relevant product at home, using data collected from collecting data
on usage of experimentally distributed products through household visits and from further
qualitative data on reasons for purchase or not purchase of experimental products.
Table 6 reports measures of experimentally-provided stock on hand before Wave 2.
For Panadol and Elyzole, the two products for which we saw a significant negative effect
from prior free distribution, stock in the Free treatment group is no higher than in the Sale
group. In fact, due to differences across treatments in the maximum quantity available per
household (see Section 3.1 for details), average experimentally-provided stock-on-hand in
the Sale treatment of the Panadol group was actually larger than in the Free treatment. To
the extent that stock-on-hand did affect demand, it would have made households who were
offered Panadol for free in Wave 1 slightly more—not less—likely to purchase in Wave 2.
In the case of Zinkid, those in the Free treatment did have more tablets remaining. To the
extent that stock affects demand, this should lower relative purchase rates for those in the
Free treatment. In contrast to the other two products, this suggests that our estimates would
be an upper bound on the magnitude of the effect. However, Zinkid, the product for which
we expected some scope for positive learning, is the product for which we do not find a
statistically significant negative effect of free distribution on Wave 2 purchase rates.
The preceding results examine only the remaining experimental stock and do not con-
sider the household’s overall stock, which could be obtained from other sources. To address
this, we asked respondents in a post-marketing survey why they did not purchase products
in Wave 2. As Figure 1 shows, we do not find a higher share of respondents in the Free
group giving “I already have enough of it” as reason for not purchasing. If anything, the
share is higher in the Sale group, but the differences are not statistically significant. These
18
findings suggest that stock is not the major driver of lower purchase rates following a free
distribution compared to sale. Nonetheless, it may be that other factors, such as differ-
ences in the perception of the relative quality of our products or competitiveness of our
prices compared to other health suppliers due to differential purchase rates outside of our
experimental set-up across treatments may play a role in explaining our results.27
A second potential mechanism is a pricing regime change story. Seeing a free distribu-
tion could generate the expectation of future free distributions. Indeed, in the Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006) model, reference points are set in part by rational expectations about future
prices. This is a plausible mechanism for generating price anchors in our setting as well.
We would have expected it to be more of a factor for free distributions by an NGO (from
which one might reasonably expect free distributions to continue) than from for-profits
(from which they are unlikely). As described earlier, this, in part, motivated our interest in
distributor identity; however, the effect of prior free distributions on subsequent purchases
does not vary along this dimension.
A third potential mechanism is income effects. People who received the health products
may have lost fewer workdays due to illness during the ten weeks between the two waves
and thus may have had more disposable funds to purchase products in the second wave
of marketing. If an income effect existed, this would have increased relative demand in
the Free group and would therefore imply that we are underestimating the price anchoring
effect. It is worth noting that in contrast to insecticide-treated bed nets, where income ef-
fects could exist, we expect any income effects of the products in this study to be relatively
modest.
Fourth, liquidity may have affected demand. Since households who received the prod-
uct for free effectively received a transfer, they may have had more money available when
marketers appeared in Wave 2. However, any effect along this dimension would tend to
increase demand in the Free treatment. We would also expect any effects to be quite small.
The magnitude of the transfer was low—about $0.80 per household. Moreover, villages
were revisited approximately ten weeks later and this future visit was not announced at the
time of the first. It seems implausible that people kept the funds they would have otherwise
spent on drugs in Wave 1 for a full ten weeks. Finally, to mitigate liquidity constraints,
flyers were distributed a few days prior to each marketing visit to allow respondents to get
27The products we offered were available for sale in local drug shops in 11%-36% of the study villages
(see Table 1). There are no distinguishable difference in the effect of prior free distribution on subsequent




A fifth possible mechanism affecting demand is positive externalities. The argument
here would be that higher take-up in Wave 1 reduced disease prevalence and hence the
utility from purchasing the product in Wave 2. However, an externality argument cannot
explain the negative effect on purchase rates in Wave 2 from free distribution for Panadol,
since it is implausible that pain relievers have meaningful externalities. In contrast, the
deworming medicine Elyzole does have positive externalities. Dewormed children are less
likely to transmit worms to their siblings and peers (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Ozier,
2011), which could explain a negative effect of free distribution on later purchase rates.
However, to the extent that such effects were present in our study, we expect that they were
quite small. On average, we distributed Elyzole to only about five percent of households
per village in Wave 1. As such, any reduction in disease loads and hence the utility of
purchase in Wave 2 would have been quite small.
Sixth, habit formation may have influenced demand. Suppose that upon receiving the
health products, households become habituated to using them. Habit formation would
make it more likely that households who received the product in Wave 1 then purchase
the product in Wave 2, regardless of the direction of learning effects. Since a higher share
of households received the products in the villages assigned to the Free treatment, habit
formation should have a positive effect on demand there. In contrast, our results move in
the opposite direction.
Seventh, higher prices may signal higher quality (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Heffetz
and Shayo, 2009; Ashraf et al., 2013). All else equal, being offered a product for a higher
price should then increase later demand just as we would expect from the price anchoring
model. However, the signaling mechanism should have a larger effect for products with
more uncertainty about the benefits and would have the exact opposite effect of our model
of experience learning, i.e., positive prices should increase relative demand for the least
well-known products. Furthermore, we would expect that the price signal would be likely
to be relatively less important for a product like Panadol where the majority of respondents
in both sale and free distribution personally experienced whether the product alleviated
their pain (since the high percentage of the sample who received Panadol are overwhelming
likely to have consumed some of the product). While our point estimates across products
are in line with the anchoring mechanism rather than the quality signal alternative, we again
note that the differences in these estimates are not statistically significant. We cannot rule
out the possibility that prices as a signal of quality may explain some of the differences in
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purchase rates following free and sale distributions. Since these mechanisms have distinct
policy implications, we think further research to distinguish their effects would be useful.
Finally, cognitive costs of determining a product’s value may influence our results.
Suppose that any time individuals are faced with a positive price on a less well established
product, they have some probability of being willing to incur the cognitive cost of deter-
mining their own valuation for the product. Without first having determined their valuation,
they do not buy, since they are uncertain whether the price is above or below their personal
valuation of the good. Then, being repeatedly exposed to a purchase decision should in-
crease purchase rates, since in every subsequent interaction fewer and fewer people need
to incur the cognitive cost.
While we chose three health products specifically for variation in the scope for learning
about the products themselves, we acknowledge that our experiment could have induced
learning on other dimensions. For example, households could have updated their beliefs
about the relative attractiveness of our experimental prices or the relative value of branded
versus generic medicines. The three products also differ along other dimensions, e.g.,
the target users. We therefore interpret the variation across products as suggestive of the
experience good model of learning and its interaction with price anchors, not as a crisp test
of theory.
Finally, we note several methodological lessons from our exercise. First, this was a
fairly large study but still was hampered by statistical power concerns when testing sepa-
rately across products. This is often the case when examining heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects. For this particular question, having micro-level data on both consumers’ willingness-
to-pay at baseline (e.g., as done in Berry et al., 2018) or on consumers’ knowledge and
beliefs would have improved power. The methodological tradeoff is the loss of some of the
“naturalness” of the exercise as implemented in this study. Second, while it would entail
another tradeoff against naturalness, entrance into the sample frame should be done iden-
tically for all treatment groups. Whereas in our setup we did not have differential attrition
fromWave 1 toWave 2, the flyers distributed in anticipation of the study, intended to follow
normal marketing procedures, did generate a higher entrance-into-the-sample rate for the
free distribution versus the sale. Third, conducting this type of experiment in settings with
more diversity of market conditions (e.g., with respect to the presence and pricing of drugs)
would provide a valuable opportunity to examine how local market conditions influence the
results. Fourth, building this exercise on top of other long-term data collection would pro-
duce important economies of scale in operations and also provide access to richer baseline
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and long-term data. This would allow researchers to examine everything from more nu-
anced heterogeneous treatment effects to long-term usage, welfare and market responses.
5 Conclusion
The way in which a product is distributed today can have lasting effects on demand. Previ-
ously observed prices can anchor perceptions of value. Experience with a product informs
an individual’s beliefs about its intrinsic value. The form of a distribution or identity of a
distributor can be interpreted a signal of quality.
This paper studies these issues through a field experiment in northern Uganda in which
three curative health products, chosen for variation in the scope for learning and not for
policy relevance, were distributed door-to-door either free or for sale and by either an NGO
or a for-profit company. Our key outcome measure is the observed purchase rate for these
products during a subsequent door-to-door sale ten weeks later by an unrelated, for-profit
firm. For all three products, purchase rates are lower after a free distribution. While several
alternative mechanism could explain the difference, we can rule out the mechanical effect
of having more experimentally-provided stock on hand. Households’ qualitative responses
are suggestive of price anchors.
While not dispositive, the pattern of subsequent demand across the three products pro-
vides suggestive support for the predictions of Dupas (2014) and contributes to the literature
on experience goods pricing (Nelson, 1970; Villas-Boas, 2004; Shapiro, 1983; Bergemann
and Välimäki, 2006). There is a tension between learning and the potential for prices to di-
rectly affect individuals’ willingness to pay, irrespective of a product’s intrinsic value. This
mechanism may be particularly important in the case of pharmaceutical demand (Crawford
and Shum, 2005) and health goods in low income countries more generally (Dupas, 2011).
It is also applicable to agricultural products and other goods where subsidies or discounts
are common policy instruments. While we do not find evidence of price anchors for one
product spilling over to another, the potential for categorical price judgments is high and
could affect supply through market entry decisions. This remains an important area for
future research.
Surprisingly, purchase rates after a free distribution do not vary with the distributor’s
identity. If households perceive price signals from an NGO (from whom they could reason-
ably expect some chance of future free distributions) differently than those from a for-profit
company, it does not affect subsequent purchase rates in our study. However, distribu-
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tor identity does matter for the contemporaneous sale of the relatively unknown product.
Households are 50 percent more likely to purchase Zinkid, an improved but largely un-
known treatment for childhood diarrhea, from the non-profit than from the for-profit firm
selling at the same price and providing the same product information. The finding that
NGOs are more effective at stimulating demand for unknown products has important pol-
icy implications and merits further attention (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan, 2014).
Ultimately, the answer to the question “how will one-time subsides affect future de-
mand” is simple: it depends. We studied, in one context, a few important factors. Building
a robust model that both informs policy and extends our knowledge of markets requires fur-
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Figure 1: Reasons for Not Purchasing, Wave 2
Note. Share of respondents reporting a specific reason for not purchasing the offered product in Wave 2 conditional on
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By Type
Free Sale NGO For-Profit (1) vs (2) (3) vs (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wave 1 Respondents
Individual Level
Female 0.529 0.538 0.516 0.550 0.661 0.090 3879
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.498)
Respondent age 42.984 42.781 43.214 42.545 0.873 0.595 1016 a
(14.579) (14.762) (14.511) (14.813)
Number of children under 16 4.475 4.339 4.378 4.457 0.403 0.628 1016 a
(2.417) (2.287) (2.368) (2.356)
Wealth proxy (cows owned) 1.058 0.874 0.893 1.070 0.271 0.297 1016 a
(2.601) (2.137) (2.365) (2.459)
Visited for usage check 0.080 0.090 0.085 0.085 0.060 0.968 3879
(0.271) (0.287) (0.279) (0.279)
Found in Wave 2 0.747 0.742 0.765 0.723 0.856 0.107 3879
(0.435) (0.438) (0.424) (0.447)
N 2016 1863 1948 1931
Village Level
Number of drug outlets 1.167 1.367 1.167 1.367 0.483 0.483 120
(1.452) (1.657) (1.520) (1.594)
Panadol available
b 0.383 0.333 0.333 0.383 0.572 0.572 120
(0.490) (0.475) (0.475) (0.490)
Elyzole available
b 0.233 0.250 0.217 0.267 0.833 0.526 120
(0.427) (0.437) (0.415) (0.446)
Zinkid available
b 0.117 0.100 0.100 0.117 0.771 0.771 120
(0.324) (0.303) (0.303) (0.324)
Reports free distribution of any 0.500 0.483 0.433 0.550 0.857 0.204 120
   drug in last 3 mo.
c (0.504) (0.504) (0.500) (0.502)
Reports free distribution of any 0.467 0.450 0.383 0.533 0.856 0.101 120
   deworming drug in last 3 mo.
c (0.503) (0.502) (0.490) (0.503)
Reports free distribution of 0.050 0.050 0.033 0.067 1.000 0.406 120
   Elyzole in last 3 mo.
c (0.220) (0.220) (0.181) (0.252)
N 60 60 60 60
Panel B: Wave 2 Respondents
Female 0.509 0.509 0.489 0.530 0.990 0.066 2887
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Respondent age 43.507 42.979 43.685 42.783 0.699 0.516 779 a
(14.783) (14.601) (14.184) (15.307)
Number of children under 16 4.523 4.383 4.456 4.470 0.461 0.940 779 a
(2.461) (2.346) (2.413) (2.413)
Wealth proxy (cows owned) 1.097 0.896 1.000 1.023 0.314 0.911 779 a
(2.628) (2.273) (2.577) (2.361)
Visited for usage check 0.083 0.091 0.091 0.083 0.246 0.278 2887
(0.276) (0.288) (0.287) (0.276)
N 1505 1382 1490 1397
Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics
Wave 1 Treatment Assignment
Standard deviations reported in parentheses. (a) Variable available only for participants in accompanying methodological study (see Section 2.1.1). (b) A
product is "available" in a village if it is "mostly" or "always" available in at least one outlet/drugshop of the village. (c) Reports of free distribution based on
village chief's (LC1's) answer to the questions "Has [the product] been distributed for free in the past in this village?" and, if so, "When was the product last
distributed for free in this village?", where "yes" is coded as 1 and "no" or "I do not know" are coded 0. P-values for individual regressions adjusted for
clustering at the village level.
p-value of 








say they recognize 
the brand
Percent giving a 
price estimate 
(any brand)
Percent giving a 
price estimate 
(same brand) N
Drug (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panadol 95.5% 10.2% 87.7% 9.4% 1282
Elyzole 64.4% 7.7% 58.4% 6.5% 1191
Zinkid/ORS 51.4% 5.9% 45.6% 4.5% 1275
Zinkid (lower & upper bound)
a 16.3%-45.6% 1.3%-4.5% 1275
Aquasafe 71.4% 15.8% 65.7% 14.3% 2019
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Respondents' Familiarity with Products
These data were collected during the Wave 1 by a marketer. Prior to marketing, we asked respondents about the two products that
would not later be marketed to them. Column 1 reports answers to the question "Do you recognize this product that I have here?
(Briefly describe what the product is, what it does)". Column 3 reports answers to the question, "How much would you expect to
pay for this product [there]?". The available choices were: (a) Don't know, (b) It is free, (c) It is sold at this price: UGX_____
(enter amount), (d) I am not certain, but I would estimate this price: UGX_____. (a) Zinkid and ORS were shown as bundle. In
order to unbundle familiarity with the two products, we exploited whether respondents gave the price estimate in the unit of sachets 
or tablets. A respondent giving a price in the unit of sachets is taken to refer to ORS, since Zinkid is distributed in tablets. Since we
cannot rule out that people knew both drugs but only reported their perceived price of ORS, this estimate is a lower bound. The
upper bounds for familiarity levels with Zinkid are the joint levels presented for Zinkid/ORS. 
Product Offered :








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Sample: All households on tracking sheets
NGO in Wave 1 0.038     0.025     0.011     -0.040     0.002     0.002     0.101*** 0.110***
(0.031)    (0.051)    (0.041)    (0.109)    (0.037)    (0.047)    (0.035)    (0.039)    
Free in Wave 1 0.360*** 0.101**  0.240*** -0.369*** 0.352*** 0.194*** 0.485*** 0.463***
(0.028)    (0.041)    (0.034)    (0.076)    (0.034)    (0.038)    (0.036)    (0.038)    
Free*NGO -0.022     -0.002     0.003     0.063     0.010     0.010     -0.085     -0.096*    




c 0.450*** 1.132*** 0.266*** 0.399*** 0.175*** 0.199***
(0.039)    (0.105)    (0.042)    (0.045)    (0.039)    (0.042)    
Observations 5667     5667     1802     1802     2005     2005     1860     1860     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.384     0.625     0.491     1.042     0.365     0.524     0.301     0.333     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 0.708     0.708     0.725     0.725     0.713     0.713     0.685     0.685     
Panel B. Sample: All households found in Wave 1
NGO in Wave 1 0.052     0.022     -0.007     -0.137     0.000     0.000     0.159*** 0.174***
(0.033)    (0.064)    (0.038)    (0.146)    (0.045)    (0.061)    (0.044)    (0.049)    
Free in Wave 1 0.468*** 0.068     0.237*** -0.733*** 0.463*** 0.233*** 0.700*** 0.666***
(0.023)    (0.045)    (0.024)    (0.097)    (0.029)    (0.040)    (0.033)    (0.038)    
Free*NGO -0.054     -0.019     0.011     0.142     -0.007     -0.014     -0.170*** -0.189***




c 0.763*** 1.847*** 0.466*** 0.695*** 0.281*** 0.317***
(0.028)    (0.128)    (0.046)    (0.062)    (0.043)    (0.051)    
Observations 3879     3879     1228     1228     1394     1394     1257     1257     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.580     0.945     0.754     1.599     0.539     0.774     0.460     0.508     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 0.999     0.999     0.997     0.997     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     
Panel C. Sample: All households found in Wave 2
NGO in Wave 1 0.060*    0.076     0.011     -0.034     -0.008     0.021     0.170*** 0.201***
(0.035)    (0.072)    (0.043)    (0.169)    (0.052)    (0.079)    (0.052)    (0.054)    
Free in Wave 1 0.461*** 0.070     0.231*** -0.716*** 0.442*** 0.204*** 0.702*** 0.687***
(0.023)    (0.050)    (0.028)    (0.115)    (0.034)    (0.049)    (0.036)    (0.035)    
Free*NGO -0.063*    -0.072     -0.007     0.046     0.002     -0.034     -0.180*** -0.213***




c 0.761*** 1.830*** 0.499*** 0.768*** 0.265*** 0.292***
(0.047)    (0.185)    (0.053)    (0.082)    (0.051)    (0.056)    
Observations 2887     2887     926     926     1027     1027     934     934     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.595     0.996     0.777     1.688     0.548     0.812     0.467     0.515     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000     
Table 3: Demand in Wave 1
Pooled
Village assignment to treatment was block randomized according to two variables. The first, price environment, included information about
pricing and drug availability with three possible categories: (1) no drug outlets or none of our drugs; (2) no prices above the median or
distributed for free; and (3) at least one price above the median. The second, remoteness, also had three categories: (1) easy to travel and close to
health center; (2) difficult travel or far from health center; and (3) difficult travel and far from health center. All regressions include controls for
stratification cell. Regressions in Panel B include control for Wave 1 respondent gender; regressions in Panel C include controls for Wave 1
respondent gender and whether Wave 2 respondent was same gender. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. * Denotes significance
at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and *** at the 1-percent level. (a) The generic names for the three drugs are: paracetamol for
Panadol, albendazole for Elyzole, zinc for Zinkid. (b) The "quantity" dependent variable is the number of units (defined as doses) received or
purchased. Respondents in the Free group were offered one unit, respondents in the Sale group were able to purchase up to five units. (c)















Same As Wave 1? Same Same Same Same Different
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Take-up
NGO in Wave 1 0.019     0.035     0.034     -0.002     0.055     
(0.032)    (0.040)    (0.056)    (0.052)    (0.059)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.100*** -0.116*** -0.118*    -0.053     0.044     
(0.037)    (0.036)    (0.061)    (0.054)    (0.059)    
Free*NGO 0.017     0.050     -0.006     -0.002     -0.109     
(0.051)    (0.058)    (0.086)    (0.074)    (0.078)    
Constant N/A
c 0.838*** 0.306*** 0.241*** 0.436***
(0.074)    (0.068)    (0.067)    (0.069)    
Observations 2150     687     786     677     737     
Test of equality of Free coefficient w.r.t.
   Panadol 0.094     N/A     0.982     0.243     0.003     
   Elyzole 0.208     0.982     N/A     0.336     0.034     
   Zinkid 0.820     0.243     0.336     N/A     0.169     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.555     0.866     0.521     0.276     0.571     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 0.480     0.709     0.379     0.233     0.566     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.016     0.126     0.034     0.281     0.198     
Effect of Free in specification -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.120*** -0.053     -0.010     
   excluding NGO terms (0.025)    (0.028)    (0.041)    (0.037)    (0.039)    
Panel B: Quantity
b
NGO in Wave 1 -0.003     -0.086     0.048     0.022     0.052     
(0.069)    (0.172)    (0.096)    (0.059)    (0.092)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.213*** -0.429*** -0.154     -0.060     0.101     
(0.073)    (0.151)    (0.097)    (0.057)    (0.111)    
Free*NGO 0.111     0.376     -0.056     0.021     -0.176     
(0.114)    (0.237)    (0.138)    (0.095)    (0.142)    
Constant N/A
c 1.813*** 0.510*** 0.216*** 0.512***
(0.181)    (0.108)    (0.067)    (0.098)    
Observations 2150     687     786     677     737     
Test of equality of Free coefficient w.r.t.
   Panadol 0.007     N/A     0.100     0.011     0.000     
   Elyzole 0.795     0.100     N/A     0.338     0.025     
   Zinkid 0.262     0.011     0.338     N/A     0.117     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.845     1.720     0.688     0.312     0.714     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 0.729     1.363     0.495     0.240     0.762     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.207     0.754     0.031     0.607     0.370     
Effect of Free in specification -0.157*** -0.240**  -0.182*** -0.047     0.011     
   excluding NGO terms (0.052)    (0.110)    (0.067)    (0.047)    (0.069)    
Village assignment to treatment was block randomized according to two variables. The first, price environment, included
information about pricing and drug availability with three possible categories: (1) no drug outlets or none of our drugs; (2)
no prices above the median or distributed for free; and (3) at least one price above the median. The second, remoteness, also 
had three categories: (1) easy to travel and close to health center; (2) difficult travel or far from health center; and (3)
difficult travel and far from health center. All regressions include controls for stratification cell. Standard errors clustered by
village in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and *** at the 1-percent
level. (a) The generic names for the three drugs are: paracetamol for Panadol, albendazole for Elyzole, zinc for Zinkid, and
sodium dichloroisocyanurate for Aquasafe. (b) The "quantity" dependent variable is the number of units purchased. (c)
Includes product-specific intercept. 
Table 4: Demand in Wave 2








Same As Wave 1? Same Same Same Same Different
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Sample: All households on tracking sheets
NGO in Wave 1 0.012     0.044     0.005     -0.010     0.013     
(0.022)    (0.042)    (0.031)    (0.024)    (0.033)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.048**  -0.053     -0.051     -0.040     0.046     
(0.024)    (0.037)    (0.035)    (0.027)    (0.036)    
Free*NGO 0.048     0.092     0.026     0.031     0.002     
(0.035)    (0.059)    (0.052)    (0.039)    (0.046)    
Constant N/A
c 0.426*** 0.178*** 0.123*** 0.236***
(0.048)    (0.030)    (0.032)    (0.040)    
Observations 4242     1333     1526     1383     1425     
p-value of Free = 0 0.046     0.161     0.147     0.148     0.201     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.994     0.374     0.469     0.754     0.133     
Panel B. Sample: All households found in Wave 1
NGO in Wave 1 0.013     0.034     0.019     -0.010     0.001     
(0.030)    (0.048)    (0.048)    (0.037)    (0.046)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.098*** -0.130*** -0.096*    -0.068*    0.032     
(0.033)    (0.043)    (0.052)    (0.039)    (0.048)    
Free*NGO 0.057     0.119*    0.017     0.043     0.003     
(0.046)    (0.065)    (0.073)    (0.056)    (0.062)    
Constant N/A
c 0.715*** 0.266*** 0.194*** 0.400***
(0.065)    (0.054)    (0.052)    (0.054)    
Observations 2897     910     1064     923     982     
p-value of Free = 0 0.003     0.003     0.067     0.084     0.508     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.196     0.817     0.103     0.543     0.409     
Panel C. Sample: All households found in Wave 2
NGO in Wave 1 0.019     0.035     0.034     -0.002     0.055     
(0.032)    (0.040)    (0.056)    (0.052)    (0.059)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.100*** -0.116*** -0.118*    -0.053     0.044     
(0.037)    (0.036)    (0.061)    (0.054)    (0.059)    
Free*NGO 0.017     0.050     -0.006     -0.002     -0.109     
(0.051)    (0.058)    (0.086)    (0.074)    (0.078)    
Constant N/A
c 0.838*** 0.306*** 0.241*** 0.436***
(0.074)    (0.068)    (0.067)    (0.069)    
Observations 2150     687     786     677     737     
p-value of Free = 0 0.007     0.002     0.056     0.325     0.458     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.016     0.126     0.034     0.281     0.198     
Table 5: Demand in Wave 2, Intention to Treat Samples
Village assignment to treatment was block randomized according to two variables. The first, price environment, included
information about pricing and drug availability with three possible categories: (1) no drug outlets or none of our drugs; (2)
no prices above the median or distributed for free; and (3) at least one price above the median. The second, remoteness, also 
had three categories: (1) easy to travel and close to health center; (2) difficult travel or far from health center; and (3)
difficult travel and far from health center. All regressions include controls for stratification cell. Standard errors clustered by
village in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5-percent level; and *** at the 1-percent level.
(a) The generic names for the three drugs are: paracetamol for Panadol, albendazole for Elyzole, zinc for Zinkid, and sodium 
dichloroisocyanurate for Aquasafe. (b) The "quantity" dependent variable is the number of units purchased. (c) Includes
product-specific intercept. 
Sale Free p-value N Sale Free p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of tablets distributed in Wave 1
Panadol 21.36 10.00 0.00 99 75.5% 16.13 9.98 0.00
Elyzole 8.68 6.00 0.00 85 54.1% 4.69 5.99 0.00
Zinkid & ORS 11.03 10.00 0.12 67 38.3% 4.22 9.97 0.00
Mean tablets remaining from experimental stock
Panadol 2.56 1.03 0.04 99 75.5% 1.93 1.02 0.16
Elyzole 0.16 0.04 0.44 85 54.1% 0.09 0.04 0.65
Zinkid & ORS 5.34 4.86 0.69 67 38.3% 2.05 4.84 0.00
Proportion of tablets used
Panadol 0.90 0.90 0.91 99 75.5% N/A N/A N/A
Elyzole 0.99 0.99 0.67 85 54.1% N/A N/A N/A
Zinkid & ORS 0.53 0.51 0.90 67 38.3% N/A N/A N/A
Share of respondents who have positive experimentally provided stock
Panadol 0.37 0.18 0.04 99 75.5% 0.28 0.17 0.20
Elyzole 0.03 0.02 0.88 85 54.1% 0.01 0.02 0.78
Zinkid & ORS 0.59 0.61 0.88 67 38.3% 0.22 0.60 0.00
Conditional on 
receiving any in   
Wave 1




Scaled to include non-
takeup in Wave 1
Table 6: Observed Usage Summary Statistics
Households that did not receive the a product in Wave 1 were not included in the sample for usage checks of
experimentally provided product. The share receiving the product in Wave 1 for the Free treatment is approximately 100%
for all products. In a previous version of this paper we misreported that 329 individuals were "selected" for usage checks
and 251 were "found," implying that "found" refereed to the usage checks. The variable "found" should have indicated
"found in Wave 2" and the variable "selected" should have indicated "contacted for usage checks". Because our interest in
usage checks is to understand the mechanism behind the Wave 2 results, we restrict the sample frame for analysis to only
those individuals reached in Wave 2. Results on the full sample of 329 households reached in the usage checks are
statistically identical (results available from the authors on request). We note that the attrition rate of 24% from the usage
check to Wave 2 is higher than often found in developing country studies and reflects a deliberate methodological decision
to adhere to a more "natural" marketing process, rather than persistently return to households to, in this case, adjudicate
their eligibility for a marketing prize. See Section 2 for more discussion of study design and attrition.
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A Price distribution by and within village
The graphs below show the distribution of drug prices in drug outlets in villages as well
as median price perceptions in a given village. As described in greater detail above, drug
prices were collected in a drug outlet survey. Enumerators visited each drug outlet – often
small kiosks – in a village and asked the shopkeeper about the sales price for each drug in
our sample. Price perceptions were collected during the marketing visit. Respondents were
shown products they were not offered for sale/free and asked about their perceived price of
the product.
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B Marketing scripts
B.1 Treatment-specific marketing information
• [NGO] UHMG is a Ugandan-based non-governmental organization based in Kam-
pala. UHMG believes that every person in Uganda should have access to affordable
health products. UHMG is motivated by the desire to save lives. It is a charity, which
means that it makes no profits, and it is funded by international donors.
• [SALE] Today UHMG’s beneficiaries are asked to pay a small amount to share the
cost of distribution, which allows the good work to be extended to a greater number
of needy people.
– [FREE] Today I am distributing health products for free throughout the village.
• [FOR-PROFIT] Star Pharmaceuticals is a large for-profit company based in Kam-
pala. We sell drugs and health products throughout Uganda. We believe everyone
should pay for health products they want, and we believe making profits is a good
way to drive progress. We want to become the most successful company in Uganda,
and we do this by offering good prices to our customers.
– [SALE] Today you have the opportunity to buy your normal products at the
great prices Star Pharmaceuticals offers, right at your doorstep.
– [FREE] Today, however, we are distributing our products for free, right at your
doorstep, to raise our profile in Gulu.
B.2 Product-specific marketing information
PANADOL
Have you ever returned home from the garden with a pounding headache, or aches in your
muscles and joints? Has your child ever woken you in the middle of the night, complaining
that their head or stomach is aching? Imagine if one of these things occurred tomorrow,
what would you do? You have to run to a drug shop or medical center. But what if that is
far away, or there is a long queue, or they are closed or out of stock? That is a bad solution.
As both you and I know, one of the best painkillers is Panadol, and yet it is often hard to
find. So today, I have Panadol tablets for sale/for free right here! [Take out one unit] I am
selling this sheet of 10 tablets for the great price of 500 shillings. I am giving you one sheet
of 10 tablets. [Dosage/usage instructions] So, how many sheets will you buy? So, will you
accept this product?
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ELYZOLE
Do you sometimes drink water that has not been boiled or treated? Do you ever eat fruits
directly from the trees, without washing them first? This kind of behavior can lead to
worm infections of the stomach. Does anyone in your household ever complain about
stomach pains or itchy skin? These are symptoms experienced by someone who has worms.
But symptoms often take some time to appear, and so doctors usually advise people to
deworm once every three months. The only problem is that it is sometimes hard to access
deworming tablets. But today, I have Elyzole deworming tablets for sale/for free right here!
[Take out one unit] These three boxes contain a full dose of deworming tablets. There are
six tablets in here. These tablets can kill almost all types of worms that can attack humans.
I am selling them at the great price of 1500 shillings for one dose of three boxes. I am
giving you one dose of three boxes. [Dosage/usage instructions] So, how many full doses
do you want to buy? Will you accept this product?
RESTORS & ZINKID
Do you remember a time when your child suffered from diarrhea? Do you remember
how weak they became, and how worried that made you? When a child becomes ill with
diarrhea, it is important to quickly replenish all the salts and nutrients that they are losing.
I’m sure you have heard of oral rehydration salts. Giving these to a sick child is the first
stage of combating the effects of diarrhea. So for that, I am selling/giving away Restors
- a high quality brand of ORS. The second step is to provide them with zinc supplements
which can stop the diarrhea sooner and reduce the chance of diarrhea returning. For that, I
have a brand new product, Zinkid, which is to be taken in combination with ORS. Taking
these two products together is a great way to reduce the duration and severity of diarrhea
in children. Therefore I am selling one strip of 10 Zinkid tablets with one Restors sachet
in combination as one item for the great price of , to equip you with the means to combat
diarrhea in your children. Therefore I am giving away one strip of 10 Zinkid tablets with
one Restors sachet in combination as one item, to equip you with the means to combat
diarrhea in your children. [Dosage/usage information] So how many will you buy today?
So will you accept this product?
AQUASAFE
Today I am selling Aquasafe – a high quality brand of water treatment right at your door!
Often water from wells and boreholes is not suitable for drinking; it can contain harmful
bacteria, parasites and other contaminated substances. Drinking this water can cause var-
ious illnesses, including diarrhea which can be very damaging for children. I am offering
you a simple solution to this problem. Aquasafe is a fast and effective way of purifying
your water – you simply add it to a jerry-can of water and in no time it is safe to drink.
[Take out one unit] I am selling this sheet of 8 tablets for the great price of 800 shillings.
[Dosage/usage instructions] So, how many sheets will you buy?
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Wave 2 introduction
Good morning/afternoon! [Generic pleasantries] My name is ____, I am from Surgipharm
Uganda Limited. Have you heard of Surgipharm Uganda Limited before? Surgipharm
Uganda Limited is a health care company specializing in the importation, exportation, dis-
tribution and marketing of pharmaceutical products. We believe everyone should pay for
health products they want, and we believe making profits is a good way to drive progress.
We want to become the most successful company in Uganda, and we do this by supplying
quality goods. I hope you will remember the name of Surgipharm Uganda Limited. [Move
on to Aquasafe Price Perception Survey if Aquasafe is not assigned product, then to the
sales pitch.]
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C Post-Marketing Survey 
M  A  R  K  E  T       F  E  E  D  B  A  C  K 
Intended Respondent’s Name: __________________________________________________          Gender: M   F      Date of Birth:_____________ 
I met:    this person    spouse    Spouse Name: ___________________________ (If spouse was met)  Enumerator Name:___________________________ 
Product: Deworming    Panadol    ORS/Zinkid      Aquasafe         Date:                Subcounty:                Parish:    Village:  
IN ADDITION TO CIRCLING THE RESPONSE, PLEASE WRITE COMPLETE SENTENCES TO EXPLAIN THE RESPONDENT”S ANSWER MORE THOROUGHLY  
Before filling in this form, you must: 
1. Introduce yourself, conduct the Price Perception Survey, and deliver the sales pitch. 
2. Answer any questions the respondent may ask about the product to the best of your ability.
3. Wait until the respondent has made a decision to purchase or not purchase. If they purchased, any change must be handed over. 
Inform the respondent that you would now like to ask them a few brief questions that will help your organization improve in the future. To learn more 
about why they did or did not buy the product, ask the following questions: 
1) Did the respondent make a purchase? Yes No 
If ‘Yes’ move to Question 2. 
If ‘No’ move to Question 3. 
2)  [If they made a purchase]  Ask Questions a) to c) below:
a. Can you tell me more about why you bought this product?  CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY
1---I ran out of my supply   __________________________________________ 
2--- I trust you (ASK WHY AND WRITE ANSWER OPPOSITE)      __________________________________________ 
3---The price is cheaper than what I can get it for here __________________________________________ 
4--- I want to sell it on to others  __________________________________________ 
5--- I would have to travel far to find this elsewhere __________________________________________ 
6--- I want it in case someone becomes sick __________________________________________ 
7---Other (FILL IN OPPOSITE) 
99--- Didn’t answer 
b. For whom did you buy this for? CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY 
1--- Myself  2--- Adults                           3---Grandparents / Elderly 
4---Children/babies     4---Other: _______________________________________ 
99-- Didn’t answer 
c. When do you expect to start using the product?
1---This week 
2--- Next week 
3---In the next month            
4---In the next 2-3 months 
5---6 months or more 
6--- Other_________________________________ 
99—Didn’t answer 
3) [If did not make a purchase] Can you tell me more about why you did not buy this? CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY
1--- I got it for free previously, why should I buy it now?  
2--- Other people in this village have previously got it for free. 
3--- I’d like to buy it, but don’t have the money here.  
4--- I think it is too expensive.  
5--- It’s not essential.  
6--- I already have enough of it. 
99—Didn’t answer 
7--- I need to ask my spouse. 
8--- I don’t trust you or I’m uncomfortable buying this from you. 
9--- Don’t know 
10--- Didn’t answer 
11--- Other: __________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________ 
4) [Ask everyone] Is this the type of product that people in your village would resell or trade?
1---Yes     If yes, how much do you think they could sell/trade it for?    |_________| UGX --or---   Item to trade with:  ____________________ 
2---No 
99—Didn’t answer 
Leave the respondent’s home and fill out the Tracking Sheet
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D Theoretical Model
The Introduction describes the intuition of the tension between price anchoring and learn-
ing. This appendix formalizes that intuition, describing the model that served as the basis
for our experimental design. We put forward a model of households’ decisions to purchase
non-durable health products that includes both price anchoring and learning. With our
focus on these elements, we abstract away from other potentially important issues, such
as health externalities, learning from one’s neighbors, expectations about product quality,
knowledge of price distribution, risk aversion, and habit formation. While the mechanisms
we describe are applicable to repeated purchase opportunities, the key features can be seen
in a simple two-period, latent utility model. This set-up differs from typical settings in
which experience goods are analyzed in that (1) rather than constrain the distributor to be
a profit maximizer, we remain agnostic regarding its objective function and (2) similar to
Dupas (2014), we enrich the latent utility framework to allow for gain-loss utility.
In each period, a household chooses to purchase a health product if and only if its
expected utility from the product exceeds the utility cost. In any period t, a household i
purchases the product if and only if
vit ≡ Eit (vi)> εit +apt +R(pt− p
r
t ) , (3)
where Eit(v) is the expected value (vi) of the product to household i at time t; εit is a
normally-distributed, household- and time-specific preference shock with mean zero and
variance σ2ε ; pt is the price at which the product is offered in period t; a is the marginal
utility of income, which we normalize to 1; and R(pt − p
r
t ) is the gain-loss utility from
purchasing at price pt relative to reference point p
r
t (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Heidhues
and Kőszegi, 2014). We specify that prt = p
r(pt−1,d), that is, the reference point is a
function of both the immediately preceding price and the identity of the distributor, d,
which can be either an NGO (N) or a for-profit enterprise (F). We allow for any general
form of gain-loss utility such that R′ ≥ 0 and ∂ prt /∂ pt−1 > 0. This simply implies that
an increase in current prices will increase the future price reference point, and utility is
increasing in this reference point as any realized future price represents a “better deal”.
Likewise, a decrease in current price implies the opposite. It will be convenient to define
the adjusted price as p̃t = pt +R(pt− p
r
t ) , that is, the current price plus the gain-loss utility
from purchasing at that price. For notation, if household i purchases the product in period t,
Pit = 1; if she does not, Pit = 0. We denote by πit the probability that household i purchases
the product at time t, and by πt the expected share of the population that purchases.
Households are heterogeneous and differ in their true value of the product, vi, where
vi = v̄+ σiv. For analytical tractability, we assume that this true value is normally dis-
tributed, vi ∼ N(v̄,σ
2
v ). In period 0, a share of the households, α0 ∈ [0,1], is informed of
their true values. The remaining households receive a signal of their value, ṽit = vi+b+bit ,
where b captures the mean bias in the population and bit ∼ N(0,σ
2
b ) .
28 Note that we are
28This is an alternative representation for the definition of pessimistic and optimistic customers used by
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explicitly allowing for the possibility that the expected value of the product in the unin-
formed population may differ from the truth. If households tend to be optimistic about the
value of a product, b will be positive; for pessimistic beliefs, b will be negative. For in-
formed households, vit = vi, i.e., the true value. As in other literature on experience goods
pricing (Bergemann and Välimäki, 2006), if a household receives the product, we assume
they become perfectly informed about its value to them.
The share of individuals purchasing in period t can be expressed as follows:29
πt = αtE (πt | In f ormed)+(1−αt)E (πt |Unin f ormed) . (4)
The expected share of informed individuals purchasing in any period can be calculated
simply as:
E (πt | In f ormed) = Pr(vi > εit + p̃t)











ε . Similarly, the expected share of uninformed individuals purchasing
in any period can be calculated as:
E (πt |Unin f ormed) = Pr(ṽit > εit + p̃t)













ε . This implies that there is more variation in the signal households






29Note that this model implicitly assumes that individuals cannot store the product. They do not buy today
with the intent of consuming in a subsequent period. This assumption is important. If individuals could store
the product for later consumption, individuals who received the product for free in round 1 may carry over
stock into round 2, mechanically reducing demand. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical support for the
assumption and show that individuals in our experiment indeed do not appear to be storing the product for fu-
ture consumption. We also assume, consistent with the work of Shapiro (1983), Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Tirole (1988) and Villas-Boas (2004), that consumers do not have an experimentation motive for purchases.
Such experimentation is analyzed in Bergemann and Välimäki (1996, 2006) and would not substantively alter
the predictions of this theoretical framework.
30While it is possible for uninformed priors to be tightly distributed around a common mean and posterior
beliefs, informed by experience, to be more dispersed, we consider situation unlikely in this context and do
not pursue it further.
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The key predictions of the model are all derived from differentiating (4)






























































The first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the information effect. It can be either positive
or negative depending on households’ starting beliefs and the value of the product relative
to its price. The second term is the price anchoring effect, which operates through the gain-
loss utility term. It serves to reduce demand by increasing the effective price for both the
informed and uninformed as the period-1 price falls. The strength of this effect depends on
the shape of the loss function R. Note that the shape of this loss function also affects the
effective price in period 2, p̃2.
Before we proceed with a discussion of the total effect of prices on subsequent demand,
we draw the link to the existing literature on experience goods and consider the effect of
prices in the absence of gain-loss utility.
Remark 1. In the absence of gain-loss utility (R′ = 0), if households are not perfectly
informed (α1 < 1) and have unbiased beliefs about the value of the product (b = 0), then
reducing the price in period 1 will (a) reduce demand in period 2 (π2) if the period 2-price
is above the average value of the product, p2 > v̄, and (b) increase π2 if p2 < v̄.
Reducing the price in any period will increase contemporaneous demand and thereby
the share of the population that has experience with the product. When some of the popula-
tion is uninformed, a lower price in the current period increases the share of the population
that knows the true value in the next period. The effect of this increase in experience on
future demand depends on how the future price compares to the value of the product. When
the period-2 price is above the average value, this learning effect tends to decrease demand.
Intuitively, when price is above the average value, demand for the product is coming from
individuals with positive idiosyncratic shocks (σbit) to their beliefs about the true value.
When more individuals are informed, it is relatively less likely that any given individual
will have received shocks large enough to induce them to buy. Expected demand falls.
Naturally, the reverse holds when the period-2 price is below the expected value: increas-
ing the informed share of the population increases demand.
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We now consider the effect of biased beliefs about the product’s value.
Remark 2. In the absence of gain-loss utility (R′ = 0), if households are not perfectly
informed (α1 < 1) and have biased beliefs about the value of the product (b 6= 0), then
reducing the price in period 1 (p1 = 0) will (a) reduce demand in period 2 (π2) if p2 >




The additional term in the price cutoff rule, σIσU−σI
b, reflects the debiasing effect. In-
creasing the share of informed individuals not only reduces uncertainty but also reduces the
share of individuals with biased beliefs. This makes it more likely that demand in period 2
will decrease if beliefs are optimistic and more likely that demand will increase if they are
pessimistic.
We are now in a position to make a prediction about the effect of free distribution on
purchase behavior.
Proposition 1. If individuals are fully informed about the value of the product (a1 = 1) and
there is no gain-loss utility (R′ = 0), then free distribution will have no effect on subsequent
demand relative to a distribution at a positive price.
Intuitively, if individuals are already fully informed and there is no gain-loss utility,
then both channels through which prior prices can affect future demand will be shut down.
This leads immediately to a hypothesis regarding the presence of gain-loss utility (price
anchors) that we can test with the distribution of Panadol, a well-known product for which
we can reasonably assume that everyone knows the value.
Assumption 1. Price reference points are more sensitive to updating after a distribution
by an NGO than by a for-profit, that is, ∂ prt /∂ pt−1|d=N > ∂ p
r
t /∂ pt−1|d=F .
The justification for this assumption was described in the introduction: for-profit com-
panies may be known to offer free samples or steep introductory discounts, but no one
expects them to keep giving the product away for free. It leads immediately to our first
prediction.
Prediction 1. In the presence of gain-loss utility, free distributions by an NGO will have a
relatively more negative effect on subsequent demand than free distributions by a for-profit.
It will be useful to define the concept of scope for learning by which we mean that (i)
at a particular future price the expected demand for a currently informed individual differs
from that of an uninformed individual and (ii) not all individuals are informed. We say
there is scope for positive learning if E (π2| In f ormed, p̃2)> E (π2|Unin f ormed, p̃2), i.e.,
at a given price, individuals who are informed about the value of the product would be more
likely to purchase than those who are not. Note that this depends on the price. To see this,
consider the case where uninformed individuals have unbiased beliefs about the product’s
value but are simply more uncertain. When the period-2 price is below the average value, it
is only those with particularly negative idiosyncratic shocks (σbit) to their beliefs about the
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true value who do not buy. When more individuals are informed, it is relatively less likely
that any given individual will have received a negative shock large enough to stop her from
buying. Naturally, having a pessimistic bias implies that there is more scope for positive
learning.
We say there is scope for negative learning if E (π2| In f ormed, p̃2) <
E (π2|Unin f ormed, p̃2), i.e., at a given price, individuals who are informed about the value
of the product would be less likely to purchase than those who are not. For example, again
consider the case where uninformed individuals have unbiased beliefs about the product’s
value but are simply more uncertain. When the period-2 price is above the average value,
demand for the product is coming from individuals with particularly positive idiosyncratic
shocks (σbit) to their beliefs about the true value. When more individuals are informed, it
is relatively less likely that any given individual will have received a sufficiently positive
shock to induce her to buy and demand falls. Naturally, having an optimistic bias implies
that there is more scope for negative learning.
As described in Section 2.1, we make the following assumption about the scope for
learning in the three products tested.
Assumption 2. There is no scope for learning with Panadol, scope for positive learning
with Zinkid, and scope for negative learning with Elyzole.
Taken together, this leads to two additional predictions.
Prediction 2. The relative effect of the free distribution for the product with scope for
positive learning, Zinkid, should be more positive than for the already well-known product,
Panadol.
When there is scope for positive learning, an increase in the share of uninformed in-
dividuals (a decrease in α1) will further increase the scope for positive learning. If unin-
formed individuals are generally pessimistic about a product’s true value and a relatively
high share of the population is uninformed (as we believe is the case for Zinkid), we expect
the effect of a free distribution to be relatively more positive (less negative) than for a free
distribution of a well-known product for which there is no scope for learning. Intuitively, as
described above, for the well-known product Panadol, if free distribution has any effect on
subsequent demand it will be through price anchoring, which will reduce demand. For the
product where we would expect to see positive learning, Zinkid, this effect would be offset
by increasing the share of informed individuals and hence increasing expected demand.
Prediction 3. The relative effect of free distribution for the product with scope for nega-
tive learning, Elyzole, should be more negative than for the already well-known product,
Panadol.
When there is scope for negative learning (e.g., uninformed individuals have optimistic
beliefs about the product’s value), an increase in the share of uninformed individuals (a
decrease in α1) will further increase the scope for negative learning and amplify the effects
of free distribution. For example, if uninformed individuals are generally optimistic about a
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product’s true value and a relatively high share of the population is uninformed, we expect
the effect of a free distribution to be relatively more negative than for a free distribution of
a well-known product for which there is no scope for learning. Intuitively, because there is
scope for negative learning for Elyzole, free distribution will tend to decrease subsequent
demand through the learning channel in addition to any effect of price anchors.
These predictions highlight the potential importance of price anchors in determining the
optimal pricing for experience goods. Lowering the current price will increase the share of
individuals who purchase in the current period and hence who are informed about product
quality in the future. The effect of this learning depends on the share of uninformed, the
mean bias in the population and the value of the product relative to the price. However,
the price anchoring effect can offset the potential increase in demand from learning, thus

























Panel A: Wave 1, Entry into Sample
Found in Wave 1 (N) 3,879 1,788
NGO treatment 0.691 0.678 0.591 a
(0.462) (0.467)
Sale treatment 0.654 0.715 0.010 a
(0.476) (0.451)
   Panadol Sale 0.635 0.728 0.000
(0.482) (0.445)
   Elyzole Sale 0.670 0.721 0.014
(0.470) (0.449)
   Zinkid Sale 0.655 0.697 0.057
(0.476) (0.460)
Female 0.651 0.705 0.000
(0.477) (0.456)
Reports free distribution of any drug in last 3 mo
c 0.679 0.690 0.656 a
(0.467) (0.463)
Village easy to reach and close to health center 0.651 0.706 0.027 a
(0.477) (0.455)
No drug shops or none of our drugs 0.691 0.679 0.612 a
   (0.462) (0.467)
Panel B: Wave 2, Attrition (conditional on entering into sample in Wave 1)
Found in Wave 2 (N) 2,887 992
Received product in wave 1 0.750 0.723 0.281 a
(0.433) (0.448)
NGO treatment 0.765 0.723 0.110 a
(0.424) (0.447)
Sale treatment 0.742 0.747 0.856 a
(0.438) (0.435)
   Panadol Sale 0.763 0.748 0.598
(0.426) (0.435)
   Elyzole Sale 0.741 0.737 0.890
(0.439) (0.441)
   Zinkid Sale 0.751 0.717 0.246
(0.433) (0.451)
Female 0.710 0.783 0.000
(0.454) (0.412)
Visited for usage check 0.763 0.743 0.418
(0.426) (0.437)
Panadol available
b 0.729 0.753 0.378 a
(0.445) (0.431)
Elyzole available
b 0.742 0.745 0.921 a
(0.438) (0.436)
Zinkid available
b 0.745 0.744 0.985 a
(0.437) (0.436)
Reports free distribution of any drug in last 3 mo
c 0.760 0.729 0.221 a
(0.427) (0.445)
Village easy to reach and close to health center 0.734 0.751 0.524 a
   (0.442) (0.433)
No drug shops or none of our drugs 0.755 0.735 0.421 a
   (0.430) (0.442)
Standard deviations reported in parentheses. (a) p-value of differences adjusted for clustering at the village level (b) A product is
"available" in a village if it is "mostly" or "always" available in at least one outlet/drugshop of the village. (c) Reports of free
distribution based on village chief's (LC1's) answer to the questions "Has [the product] been distributed for free in the past in this
village?" and, if so, "When was the product last distributed for free in this village?", where "yes" is coded as 1 and "no" or "I do not
know" are coded 0.
Table A1: Orthogonality Checks, Entry into Sample & Attrition
Find Rate Conditional on 
Row Variable
For Online Publication
Time since last free distribution (percent)
Panadol Deworming ORS Condoms Any*
In past month 1 21 2 5 26
1-3 months ago 0 26 1 1 27
3-6 months ago 0 11 1 3 13
6-12 months ago 0 11 3 3 17
More than 1 year ago 0 3 8 4 14
Cumulative; Any distributions in prior period (percent)
Panadol Deworming ORS Condoms Any*
In past month 1 21 2 5 26
0-3 months ago 1 47 3 6 49
0-6 months ago 1 58 3 8 59
0-12 months ago 1 69 7 12 73
Ever 1 72 15 16 77
Table A2: Prior Free Distribution Summary Statistics
Total sample size is 120 villages. Three had missing observations in deworming questions and are dropped from sample. *
Any free drug is indicator, equal to 1 if any of Panadol, deworming, ORS, or condoms have previously been distributed for





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Same As Wave 1? Same Same Same Same Different
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: Purchase in Wave 2
NGO in Wave 1 0.013     0.031     0.021     -0.010     0.053     
(0.038)    (0.054)    (0.062)    (0.060)    (0.069)    
Free in Wave 1 -0.088**  -0.099**  -0.105     -0.043     0.105     
(0.041)    (0.047)    (0.068)    (0.063)    (0.066)    
Free*NGO 0.016     0.048     -0.007     -0.001     -0.115     
(0.050)    (0.057)    (0.086)    (0.074)    (0.078)    
Female 0.042     0.027     0.068     0.027     0.007     
(0.036)    (0.050)    (0.078)    (0.060)    (0.061)    
Female*Free -0.022     -0.032     -0.023     -0.023     -0.111     
(0.039)    (0.063)    (0.068)    (0.068)    (0.069)    
Female*NGO 0.013     0.010     0.026     0.016     0.010     
(0.040)    (0.063)    (0.069)    (0.069)    (0.070)    
Same Gender both Waves 0.018     0.017     0.055     -0.025     0.056     
(0.028)    (0.041)    (0.048)    (0.042)    (0.042)    
Constant N/A
c 0.833*** 0.306*** 0.240*** 0.409***
(0.078)    (0.075)    (0.069)    (0.075)    
Observations 2150     687     786     677     737     
Test of equality of Free coefficient w.r.t.
   Panadol 0.147     N/A     0.934     0.376     0.004     
   Elyzole 0.207     0.934     N/A     0.436     0.020     
   Zinkid 0.962     0.376     0.436     N/A     0.080     
Mean of NGO*Sale 0.555     0.866     0.521     0.276     0.571     
Mean of For-Profit*Free 0.480     0.709     0.379     0.233     0.566     
p-value of Free = 0 0.035     0.038     0.126     0.502     0.115     
p-value of Free + Free*NGO = 0 0.088     0.364     0.091     0.482     0.868     
Table A7: Heterogeneous Effects with Respect to Respondents' Gender
Female is an indicator based on gender of Wave 1 respondent. Village assignment to treatment was block randomized according
to two variables. The first, price environment, included information about pricing and drug availability with three possible
categories: (1) no drug outlets or none of our drugs; (2) no prices above the median or distributed for free; and (3) at least one
price above the median. The second, remoteness, also had three categories: (1) easy to travel and close to health center; (2) difficult
travel or far from health center; and (3) difficult travel and far from health center. All regressions include controls for
stratification cell. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10-percent level; ** at the 5-
percent level; and *** at the 1-percent level. (a) The generic names for the three drugs are: paracetamol for Panadol, albendazole for
Elyzole, zinc for Zinkid, and sodium dichloroisocyanurate for Aquasafe. (b) The "quantity" dependent variable is the number of
units purchased. (c) Includes product-specific intercept. 
